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Abstract 
In fundraising, it is common for the donor to see how much a charity has received so far. 
What is the impact of this information on a) how much people choose to donate and b) which 
charity they choose to donate to? Conditional cooperation suggests that people will donate to 
the charity that has received the most prior support, while the Underdog Effect suggests 
increased donations to the charity with the least support. Across 2 laboratory experiments, an 
online study (combined N = 494) and a qualitative survey (N = 60), a consistent preference to 
donate to the charity with the least prior support was observed. Thus, the Underdog Effect 
was supported. We suggest people will show a preference for the underdog if there are two or 
more charities to donate to, one of the charities is at a disadvantage and people have little pre-
existing loyalty to either charity. 
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It is becoming increasingly common for charities to allow potential donors to be able to 
observe others’ prior donations (Butt & Shah, 2012). It is believed that the visibility of 
previous donations provides social information that potential donors can use to help inform 
their own donation decisions. A number of studies examining this type of social information 
have shown that people have a preference to give to a charity/organization with a larger 
number of previous donations (Frey & Meier, 2004; Martin & Randal, 2008). However, 
many of these studies prevented direct comparison of information across charities by using 
between subjects designs, whereby participants were presented with information about either 
one charity or another (Frey & Meier, 2004; Martin & Randal, 2008). A more realistic 
scenario is that potential donors are able to compare information on previous donations 
across charities simultaneously.  This is akin to online fundraising where donation 
information for a variety of charities can be compared. Therefore, we investigate whether, 
under this donation scenario, donors would show a preference to donate to either the most 
supported or the least supported charity. If participants do prefer the least supported charity, 
we ask: is this because they are motivated by the desire to make their donation have a bigger 
impact on the charity (the impact donor) or are they motivated by a preference to support 
those at a disadvantage (the underdog donor)? Theoretically, this paper explores the potential 
role of an underdog effect in charitable decisions. First, we review the theories that support 
the preference to give to a charity with greater prior support. We then review the theories 
supporting the preference to contribute to a charity with the least prior support. Finally, we 
explore how these preferences may be moderated by the observability of prior donations 
before outlining the current research. 
Preferences for giving to a charity with greater prior support 
Conditional cooperation suggests that there should be a positive association between 
the amount others have already contributed to a cause and how much another individual will 
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contribute (Fischbacher, Gachter, & Fehr, 2001). That is, if a large number of people are 
known to have donated to one charity compared to another, then conditional co-operators 
should be more likely to contribute to the charity with a greater number of prior donations. 
For example, Frey and Meier (2004) informed students that either 64% or 46% of past 
students contributed to two student funds. Those students were 2.3% more likely to donate to 
the charity to which they believed 64% of previous students had donated. Quality Signaling 
theory suggests that individuals give to charities that already have high levels of contributions 
because they are perceived to be: (1) of higher quality, (2) more likely to use donations 
effectively, and (3) more likely to receive future donations (Vesterlund, 2003).  
Preferences for giving to a charity with least prior support 
Duncan's (2004) ‘Impact Philanthropy’ model defines an alternative type of 
philanthropic donor, known as an impact donor. Impact donors derive satisfaction from 
knowing their contribution makes a real difference to the level of goods and/or services 
provided by a charity. If other donors have given substantially to a charity then, potentially, 
any additional donations will have a smaller effect on increasing the level of goods and/or 
services that the charity provides. To test this model empirically, Borgloh, Dannenberg, and 
Aretz, (2013), gave participants the option of donating to a charity that has a small (€40,000-
300,000) or large (€5-11 million) annual revenue. They found that 73% of participants 
choose to give to the charity with the smaller revenue, which resulted in an additional €323 
being donated to that charity. Borgloh et al (2013) suggested donations to the charity with a 
smaller revenue would have greater impact since the donors’ contributions would have the 
largest effect on increasing the endowment of the charity.  
An alternative explanation focuses on the ‘Underdog Effect’ where one favors a 
previous unaffiliated entity, which is perceived to be at an undeserved disadvantage relative 
to others (Vandello, Goldschmied, & Richards, 2007). The ‘Underdog Effect’ is a robust 
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phenomenon observed in voting behavior, brand loyalty, and sports spectators’ choice of 
team (Goldschmied & Vandello, 2012; Goldschmied & Vandello, 2009; Shirai, 2017). The 
Underdog Effect may then be plausibly extended to charitable decision making, predicting 
that donors should give to the charity with the least revenue since that charity is at a relative 
disadvantage (i.e. less funding). Indeed, the concept of the underdog is highly accessible 
(Kim et al., 2008) and a lay conception of the underdog is overly optimistic regarding the 
likelihood of the underdog succeeding (Goldschmied & Vandello, 2012). However, if the 
charity with lower revenue were perceived to be at a deserved disadvantage due to 
squandering donations (i.e. high staffing costs) then it would not be perceived as an 
underdog. 
Effects of Observability on Donations 
An ongoing, prominent debate in the charitable donation literature is whether the 
observability of a donation act increases the amount donated (Jones & Linardi, 2012; Mason, 
2016). The evidence for observability is mixed, with some researchers finding evidence that 
it increases donations, both inside and outside the laboratory (Andreoni & Petrie, 2004; 
Soetevent, 2005; van Leeuwen & Wiepking, 2013), whilst other researchers find no 
correlation between the level of observability and the amount donated (Dufwenberg & 
Muren, 2006; Jones & Linardi, 2012). Thus, studies 1 and 2 include an observability 
manipulation to contribute to the evidence on the effects of observability on donations. 
Present research 
From previous empirical findings and theoretical models, two key questions emerge. 
First, when comparing across charities, do people donate to the charity with the least prior 
support (e.g. impact donors or underdog donors) or do they favor a charity with more support 
(e.g. conditional co-operators or quality signaling). Second, if the least supported charity is 
preferred, which of the competing explanations (‘Impact Model’ or the ‘Underdog effect’) 
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best explains the behavior? Conversely, if the greater-supported charity is favored, which 
explanation (conditional cooperation or quality signaling) is preferred? These questions are 
addressed in four studies. 
Study 1 
The first study explores whether participants donate more on average to a charity with 
more existing support than that with less existing support. 
Method 
Participants.  
156 students were recruited from the University of Nottingham through convenience 
sampling. Four cases were dropped due to invalid responses (i.e. allocating more money to 
charity than their endowment) and one further case was dropped due to technical problems. 
The final sample of 151 students consisted of 61 males (40.4%), 89 females (58.9%) and one 
who wished not to disclose (0.7%). Participants completed the study in groups of between 
four and ten (M = 6.63, SD = 1.63), with each group being randomly assigned to conditions. 
Remuneration for the study was the amount participants earned minus the amount they chose 
to give to charity. The sample size, gender composition, average earnings and average 
donations are reported in  
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Table 1. 
[Insert  
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Table 1] 
Design.  
The study was a 2 (Observability: Private vs Public) by 3 (Degree of Support: 50:50 
vs 20:80 vs 80:20) by 2 (the Distribution of Resources across 80:20 and 50:50) mixed design. 
Observability and Degree of Support are between subjects factors and the Distribution of 
Resources is a within-subjects factor. Following Ariely, Bracha, and Meier (2009) and 
Kataria and Regner, (2014) observability was manipulated by informing participants in the 
public condition that they would be asked to read out their donation decisions at the end of 
the experiment to the rest of the participants in their group once everyone in their group had 
completed the study. Participants in the private condition were informed that their decisions 
UNDERDOG EFFECTS ON CHARITABLE DONATIONS 8 
 
would remain private and anonymous. Degree of support was manipulated via a screen 
entitled ‘Donations made by participants so far’. On the screen, there were two clear perspex 
jars filled with money. Each was labeled with the name of a charity (British Heart 
Foundation: BHF or Cancer Research UK: CRUK). The degrees of support in the jars varied 
across three conditions: 1) BHF is 80% full and CRUK is 20% full, 2) BHF is 20% full and 
CRUK is 80% full and 3) BHF is 50% full and CRUK is 50% full (see Figure 1). The 50:50 
condition was included to check whether one charity was preferred over another. Distribution 
of Resources is the amount of money in the jars within each of the three conditions 
(20%:80%, 80%:20%, 50%:50%). 
 [Insert Figure 1 Here] 
Procedure.  
The study was conducted in three sequential stages: (1) a money earning task, (2) a 
charity dictator game and (3) an online questionnaire.  In the money earning task, participants 
pressed the  ‘z’ then ‘x’  key in that sequence for a period of five minutes (following Ariely, 
Bracha, & Meier, 2007). Participants had been told that to earn £4 they must make 200 ‘zx’ 
responses, which all the participants did (zx responses: M = 962.62, SD = 247.49). The next 
screen informed the participants whether their donation would be public or private. 
Participants then saw a screen showing “Donations made by participants so far”. Depending 
upon the condition they were in, the jars were either 80-20%, 50-50% or 20-80% full of 
coins. The donation screen displayed three slider scales. Each slider scale went from 0 pence 
to 400 pence with the slider moving in single penny increments. The three slider scales were 
labeled: “The British Heart Foundation”, “Cancer Research UK”, or “Self”. Participants 
could donate as much or as little as they liked to BHF, CRUK or keep for themselves as long 
as total money allocated equaled 400 pence. This page also contained the pictures of the jars 
as a visual reminder. If participants were in the public condition, once everyone had 
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completed the study, they each read out their donation decisions to the rest of the participants. 
The questionnaire collected data on gender, course of study, current level of study and two 
questionnaires: Moral Foundation Questionnaire (MFQ) and Reluctant Altruism scale. The 
MFQ and reluctant altruism scale are not of current interest so are not discussed further. 
Participants were reimbursed with any money they chose to keep and all charitable donations 
were given to the relevant charities. 
Results & Discussion 
The donations in the charity dictator game were not normally distributed (Skewness 
and Kurtosis test: χ² = 992.86, p < .001) therefore non-parametric methods were used 
(D’Agostino, Belanger, & D’Agostino Jr, 1990). 
Charity Preference 
The 50:50 conditions were included to identify any preference bias for donating to 
either the BHF or CRUK. There was no significant difference in either the amount donated to 
the BHF (M= £0.81, SD = £0.84) or CRUK (M= £0.86, SD = £0.75; Wilcoxon Signed Rank 
test: z = -1.26, p = .21) or in terms of the frequency of donations to the BHF (Number 
Donated = 13) or CRUK (Number Donated = 16; Chi-Square Goodness of Fit test χ² = 0.31., 
p = .58). There was also no difference in the average amount donated between the 20-80% 
condition and 80-20% charity conditions (Wilcoxon Rank Sum test: z = -1.42, p = .15). 
Preference Based on Distribution of Resources 
As the 50:50 condition showed no charity preference effect, we compared the amount 
donated when a jar was 20% full compared to when a jar was 80% full regardless of charity. 
These analyses were run on the data from 105 participants in the 80:20 and 20:80 trials with 
those in the 50:50 trials removed. The charity with the least distribution of resources (20%) 
received more money (M = £1.64, SD = £1.08,) than the charity with a greater distribution of 
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resources (80%) (M= £1.34, SD = £.98) (Wilcoxon Signed Rank test z = 2.89, p < .01; see 
Table 2). Over the course of the study, the charity with the least distribution of resources 
received an additional £30.12 (see Table 2).  
Effects of Observability 
There was no significant effect of observability between donations in the public (M = 
£1.78, SD = £1.54) and private conditions (M = £2.02, SD = £1.59; Wilcoxon Rank Sum 
test: z = 0.79, p = .43).  
Thus, the overall results showed a preference to donate to the least supported charity 
compared to the more supported charity and no effect of observability on donations. 
Study 2 
This study aims to replicate the findings of study 1 regarding preference for the charity with 
least support (with three design changes). First, to check that the lack of an observability 
effect was not due to a relatively small sample size, a large number of participants were 
recruited. Second, we reduce the amount earned in the earning task to £3. Third, we did not 
include the 50:50 condition because study 1 showed no charity preference bias. 
Method 
Participants.  
132 students from the University of Nottingham were recruited, via convenience 
sampling. Eight cases were dropped due to invalid responses (i.e., allocating more money 
than they earnt) leaving a final sample of 124 students which contained 55 males (44.4%), 67 
females (54%) and two who wished not to disclose (1.6%). Participants completed the study 
in groups of between three and ten (M = 6.66, SD = 1.88), with each group being randomly 
allocated to a condition.  
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Design. 
  The study used a similar design to study 1 with a 2 (Observability: Public vs Private) 
by 2 (Degree of Support: 20:80 vs 80:20) by 2 (Distribution of Resources across 80:20) 
mixed design. The study consisted of three sequential stages: (1) money earning task, (2) 
charity dictator game (same as study 1) and (3) an online questionnaire. The questionnaire 
collected gender, educational attainment, past charitable behavior, level of risk, level of trust 
and the reluctant altruism scale. The present research does not focus on these measures and 
they are not discussed further.  
Procedure. 
  First, participants completed the money earning task where they were told that to earn 
£3 they must make 200 ‘zx’ responses (zx responses: M = 966.14, SD = 241.7). All 
participants had over 200 zx responses and earned £3. The rest of the procedure is identical to 
study 1. 
Results 
Donations in the charity dictator game were not normally distributed (Skewness and 
Kurtosis test: χ² = 27.46, p < .001) so nonparametric methods were used. 
Charity preference.  
There was no significant difference in either the amount donated to the BHF (M= 
£0.99, SD = £0.83) or CRUK (M= £1.00, SD = £0.84); Wilcoxon Signed Rank test, z = 0.01, 
p = .99) or in terms of the frequency of donations to the BHF (Number Donated = 30) or 
CRUK (Number Donated = 33; Chi Square Goodness of Fit test, χ² = 1.8., p = .18). There 
was also no difference in the average amount donated between the 20-80% and 80-20% 
charity conditions (Wilcoxon Rank Sum test, z = -1.12, p = .26). 
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Preference Based on Distribution of Resources  
Table 2 shows that the charity with the least distribution of resources received 
significantly higher average donations (M= £1.25 SD = £0.91) than the charity with the 
greater distribution of resources (M= £0.75 SD = £0.72) (Wilcox Signed Rank test, z = 4.76, p 
<0.001). The charity with the least distribution of resources received £56.20 more than the 
charity with the greater distribution of resources. 
Effects of Observability. 
As in study 1, there was no effect of observability on average amounts donated (z = 
0.11, p = .91) (private M = £2.01, SD = £1.08 vs public M = £1.97, SD = £1.11).  
 [Insert Table 2 Here] 
Combined Analysis of Study 1 and Study 2.  
Data from studies 1 and 2 (N = 266) were combined to see if a larger sample size 
could help identify the observability effect and to control for demographic variables (gender 
and past level of helping¹) that may be affecting charitable donations. First, a multilevel 
negative binomial regression was performed to see if the distribution of resources and 
observability predicted the amount donated to charity. The multilevel model allowed us to 
account for the within-subject component of the design (participant can distribute their 
money across the 20% and 80% full jars).  A negative binomial link was specified to account 
for the overdispersion present in the data (Conditional overdispersion = 2.49). Table 3 shows 
significantly higher donations went to the least supported charity (IRR = 0.68, SE = 0.1, p < 
.01) and no effect of observability was found (IRR = 1.00, SE = 0.15, p = .97). A multilevel 
logistic regression was conducted to explore if the distribution of resources and observability 
predicted the frequency of donations to charity. Table 4 shows significantly more people 
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donated to the least supported charity (OR = 0.47, SE = 0.13, p < .01) whilst no effect of 
observability was found (OR = 1.23, SE = 0.13, p = .62). 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
Discussion 
Both study 1 and study 2 extended the previous literature by showing that in a more 
naturalistic setting for crowd-sourcing where prior charitable donations are simultaneously 
observable, participants preference is to donate to the charity with the least prior support. 
Previous work by Borgloh et al., (2013) showed that when participants could review total 
annual revenue secured by charities they preferred to give to the poorer charity.  Thus, we 
replicate the preference for a relatively under-resourced charity in a different funding context. 
The findings of studies 1 and 2 also suggest that observability did not influence 
donating to a charity. This is at odds with the majority of the literature (Bereczkei, Birkas, & 
Kerekes, 2007; Haley & Fessler, 2005). However, the sample sizes were relatively small. As 
such, we combined the data from studies 1 and 2 giving a total N of 266 which is larger than 
sample sizes reported in other studies that found observability effects (Ariely et al., 2009, N = 
161; Kataria & Regner, 2014, N = 185), however, the non-significant effect remained. 
Study 3 
Studies 1 and 2 showed that participants gave significantly higher amounts to the 
charity with the least prior support.  It is possible that participants were donating to the less 
well-supported charity to maximise the impact of their donations, or due to the Underdog 
Effect. In this study, we try to tease apart these two accounts. To do this, an analog of a 
threshold public good game is used where the charity will only receive donated money if a 
specified threshold is achieved (de Hoop, van Kempen, & Fort, 2012). The introduction of 
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the threshold should only change the behavior of a donor motivated to maximize impact 
versus support the underdog. Before the presence of a threshold, impact donors should give to 
the charity that has the least support to maximize any increase in the charity’s revenue 
(Borgloh, Dannenberg, & Aretz, 2013). For an impact donor, when the amount of support 
already given makes the specified threshold for a charity achievable, their donation will have 
a greater impact with respect to achieving the goal, than when the amount of support already 
given means the specified threshold is far from achievable. In contrast, donors motivated to 
help the underdog should be more likely to donate to the charity with the least prior support, 
even though their donation is likely to have little impact on the charity achieving its specified 
threshold. To test this, we set up a study whereby five schools all needed to reach the same 
specified threshold but varied in how close they are to achieving it. Any donor population 
will be heterogeneous and made up of both underdog and impact donors, amongst others. We 
can, therefore, estimate those who are impact donors and those who are underdog donors by 
identifying those who give the most to the school that is closest to achieving its specified 
threshold (impact donors) versus those who give to the school that is furthest away from the 
specified threshold (underdog donors). Thus, we can examine the relative proportion of 
impact vs underdog donors. 
Method 
Sample.  
206 participants from the University of Nottingham were recruited via convenience 
sampling to take part in an online study. The final sample was 184 participants, as 22 cases 
were dropped due to missing data on key items (e.g., discrete choice task). The final sample 
consisted of 78 males (42.3%), 105 females (57.1%) and one (0.6%) who preferred not to 
disclose. Remuneration was via a conditional lottery mechanism (see Fischbacher et al., 2001 
for details) where participants had a one in ten chance of having their responses to the 
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decision task remunerated. Participants either earned up to £10 that they could keep or donate 
(some, none or all) to a local school in the form of book tokens.  
Design and Procedure.  
Participants were shown a hypothetical crowd fundraising profile describing five 
schools’ fundraising efforts to raise £130 to buy ten fruit trees to plant on its school grounds 
(based on a real-life campaign²). Participants were informed that five schools were running 
exactly the same campaign but had raised different amounts of money, and at that point, all 
schools had only two weeks left to raise the remaining amount (see Table 5). One school 
(School B) had the least previous support (£10) and was the furthest from the specified 
threshold of £130, meaning no single donor could help them achieve it. One school (school 
C) was £10 away from the specified threshold, meaning one donor could make up the 
difference. Thus, contributions to schools B and C are key to establishing the relative 
proportion of the underdog and impact donors. Participants were informed that if a school did 
not raise the required £130 within a two-week period, they would not be able to buy the ten 
fruit trees. From the presentation of stimuli, there is no reason to believe that one school is 
less deserving of a donation than another. For example, participants were informed that the 
participating schools were identical in size, Ofsted reports³ and academic attainment. From 
this crowd funding project, participants had to a) decide whether they would be willing to 
donate to one of the five schools (a discrete choice task) and if they decided to donate to one 
of the schools, then b) decide how much of a £10 endowment they would like to give or keep 
for themselves.  
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
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Results 
91 participants out of the 166 participants who donated to a school chose to donate 
(54.82%; see Table 6 and Figure 2Figure 1) to the school with the least previous support and 
furthest away from the threshold. A chi-square goodness of fit test, comparing the frequency 
of donations across the five schools against an expected frequency of chance (20%), indicated 
significant differences between the schools (χ² (4) = 144.81, p < .01). The school that had the 
least support, and was furthest from the specified threshold (School B), received a 
significantly higher number of donations than the school just below the threshold (School C, 
z = 8.18, p < .001) and all other schools (Bonferroni corrections were applied) (School A z = 
12.96, p < .001; School D z = 6.75, p < .001), p < .001; School E z = 11.39, p < .001) 
(Sharpe, 2015). The total donated to the school that had raised the least (School B) was £688, 
which is more than double any other school (see Table 6 and Figure 1). However, this school 
also had the second to the lowest mean amount donated (M = £7.64 SD = £3.07), although a 
Kruskal-Wallis test showed there was no significant difference in the average levels of giving 
across the five schools (H (4) = 6.06, p = .20) 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
[Insert Figure 2 Here] 
Discussion 
The introduction of the threshold indicated that most donors had a preference to 
contribute to the school with the least previous support and furthest away from the specified 
threshold. These are underdog donors. A smaller proportion donated to the school nearest the 
threshold and these are impact donors. However, while this effect was found for the 
frequency of donations it was not found for the average amount donated. We offer two 
explanations of why this was the case. First, this study uses ‘house money’ rather than earned 
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endowment leading to higher donations overall. Second, donors who want to maximize their 
impact must give £10 to push School C to the threshold, whilst donors wishing to support the 
least supported school cannot push it over the threshold with their contribution, hence they 
have more choice about the amount to donate.   
Study 4 
Study 3 provides some evidence that the preference for the least supported charity is 
due to the Underdog Effect. However, the Underdog Effect implies that there is an 
assumption that other potential donors are less willing generally to donate to the underdog. 
Thus, this study presents exactly the same scenario used in study 3 but as well as asking 
participants which school they would choose and how much they would donate, we ask 
participants which school they believe others would choose, and how much they expect 
others would be willing to donate. Open-ended free-response questions were also asked to 
assess why the participant chose to donate to the school they selected and why they expected 
other people to donate to the school they selected. If the Underdog Effect drives the 
preference for the least supported school, the open responses should include terms referring 
to its relative disadvantage (i.e. “has the least”) (Vandello, Goldschmied, & Richards, 2007) 
whereas, if donations are due to impact donating, responses should include making a 
difference (e.g. “biggest impact”) (Duncan, 2004). We choose a free-response format to avoid 
creating any demand characteristics and constraining participants within theoretical 
frameworks.  
Method 
Sample. 
Sixty Nottingham University students were recruited through convenience sampling.  
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Design and Procedure. 
Participants were asked to read the same crowd fundraising scenario used in study 3. 
They were then asked to answer the following six questions: i) “what school do you think 
most people would give to?”, ii) “how much do you think others would give?”, iii) “why do 
you think most people would give to that school?” iv) “what school would you give to?”, v) 
“how much would you give?” and vi) “why would you give to this school?”.  
Results 
Four participants did not respond to either: “what school do you think most people 
would give to?” (N = 1) or “how much do you think others would give?” (N = 3) therefore, 
they were excluded from those analyses. Inter-rater reliability for the deductive content 
analysis on the qualitative responses was moderate (κ = .58, z = 8.26, p < .001) between the 
two raters. All disagreements were discussed between the two raters until an agreement was 
reached. 
School Preference. 
When asked about which school they believe others would choose and which school 
they would choose themselves, the largest group of participants (28 out of 59) showed a 
preference for the school with the least support and furthest from the threshold (see Table 7). 
A Chi-square goodness of fit tests on the frequency of choices in terms of the school they 
believe others would choose (χ² (4) = 38.37, p < .01) and for which school they would choose 
themselves (χ² (4) = 49.67, p < .01) was significant. A comparison across schools showed 
that more participants donated to the least supported school (School B) compared to the 
school just below the threshold (School C) (z = 4.42, p < .05), and more participants expected 
that others would also donate to the least supported school compared to the school just below 
threshold (z = 4.73, p < .05). Furthermore, participants donated more to the least supported 
school than any other school (School A  z = 5.67, p < .05; School D z = 6.35, p < .05; School 
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E z = 7.13, p < .01) and expected others to do the same (School A  z = 3.65, p < .05; School 
D z = 5.69, p < .05; School E z = 6.05, p < .05) These results replicate study 3 and indicate 
that the effect has a normative component.   
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
Qualitative Analyses of Relatively Poor School Preference. 
Responses to ‘why do you think most people would give?’ 
Of those who gave to the most supported school (School A: already over the 
threshold), the majority (8 out of 12; 67%) focused on the fact that it had raised the most 
money (see Table 8). Whereas those who donated to the least supported school (School B) 
were concerned most with the relative disadvantage the school was at (24 out of 30; 80%). 
For example, one respondent wrote, "It is furthest away from the target." Those who donated 
to the school just below the threshold (School C) did so to a) make a difference (2 out of 8; 
25%) and b) to help it reach its target (8 out 8; 100%). One participant wrote, "by donating 
the final £10 I feel like I am making a difference."  
Responses to: ‘why you gave to this school?’ 
Choosing the most supported school (School A) was partly explained by quality 
signaling, with 2 out of 7 (29%) focusing on the fact that it had raised the most. The dominant 
response for giving to the least supported school (School B) was due to its relative 
disadvantage (22 out of 33; 67%). For example, one respondent said, "They are furthest away 
from the total so I would want to help them more." Other motives for giving to the least 
supported school were a desire to make things equal (4 out of 33; 12 %) and wanting to make 
a difference (1 out of 33; 3%). The main reason for donating to the school just below the 
threshold (School C) was the ease with which it could reach its target (10 out of 12; 83%). 
Only one respondent mentioned the desire to make an impact (1 out of 12; 8.33%).  
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[Insert Table 8 here] 
Discussion 
These results replicated the effects found in study 3, that most people choose to 
donate to the least supported school compared to any other school. The open responses 
provide support for the idea that participants gave to the least supported school because they 
were the underdog at a relative disadvantage. A small number of participants (4 out of 33; 
12%) in response to why they, not most others, would give to the least supported school 
suggested they were motivated by equality so were donating to school B to reduce its 
shortfall in donations. This indicates that there are competing explanations for supporting the 
least supported school with the dominant motive being the Underdog Effect. An unusual 
finding in this data concerns the donations made to school A, which has already reached its 
target. Participants’ qualitative responses revealed that people took the amount that ‘school 
A’ had already raised as a sign of its quality. This motivation is consistent with Vesterlund’s, 
(2003) idea that contributions to charity can be perceived by potential donors as a sign of the 
charity’s quality and thus make it appear more attractive for them to donate to. One caveat to 
the findings of the qualitative analysis is that self-report responses are subject to bias (i.e., 
demand characteristics). However, the strength of study 4 is that it allows us to move beyond 
inferring donor motivations from behavioral decisions alone, to directly recording 
motivations. Indeed, the results of the choice task replicate the results of study 3, thus we can 
have some confidence in the validity of the motivations reported. 
General Discussion  
In the absence of any specified threshold or when a threshold is a long way from 
being achieved the charity with least support benefits by receiving a higher level of average 
donations or a higher frequency of donations. This leads to the least supported charity 
receiving a nontrivial increase in total donations compared to the better-supported charity.  
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This is important as many online fundraising campaigns set a threshold to be attained. Two 
possible explanations for the preference of selecting the charity/organization with the least 
support have been suggested (i.e. ‘Impact Model’ and the ‘Underdog Effect’). The results 
provide support for the heterogeneity of preferences, with the Underdog Effect being the 
most likely explanation for giving to a charity with least support.  
However, other studies find that the charity with greater support is preferred. Why is 
this? Studies that find a preference for giving to the more supported charity have focused on 
charity campaigns that may have an immediate benefit to the donors.  The Frey and Meier 
(2004) study focused on students contributing to a student welfare scheme, the Shang and 
Croson (2009) study examined contributions from supporters/listeners to a local public radio 
station and Martin and Randal (2008) explored support to an art gallery by visitors. In all 
these examples the donor could immediately benefit and as such may be more inclined to 
help when they see others contributing as ultimately this will help them (i.e. they receive the 
hardship payments, their public radio station stays open, and their gallery stays open). In 
contrast, our study and the Borgloh et al. (2013) study do not have this immediate benefit to 
the donor. In the Borgloh et al. (2013) study, the charities were described in terms of general 
categories (e.g. medical research etc.) and as such, the participants would be less likely to 
know if they could personally benefit. In our studies, the charities were either specific 
medical charities (Cancer or Heart Disease), that young students are unlikely to have any 
immediate benefit from. Similarly, in the school’s crowdsourcing study, the participants will 
have no immediate benefit from donating to the schools. So it may be the case that 
conditional cooperation operates when there is an immediate personal benefit favoring the 
better-supported charity and the ‘Underdog Effect’ is observed when there is no immediate 
personal benefit (Kim et al., 2008).  Therefore, we hypothesize that a charity based 
‘Underdog Effect’ will be maximal when (1) there is no threshold/ or a threshold that is 
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unattainable by a single donation and (2) when donors do not directly benefit from their 
donations. This will be the case for a charity that is seen as deserving but disadvantaged with 
respect to resources.  
Implications 
This paper is important because it shows that when people have social information of 
the levels of support a charity receives and can compare this information across multiple 
charities they prefer to donate to the least supported charity. This suggests that fundraisers 
should take care to present their campaigns in real world and online contexts where their 
charity will appear less supported compared to their competitors. Conversely, if a charity is 
well supported and cannot change the real world or online contexts in which it presents itself, 
it might benefit from highlighting aspects of its current situation that make it appear at an 
undeserved disadvantage relative to some of its competitors. One way this could be achieved 
is by developing an underdog biography (Nagar, 2017). The work of Paharia, Keinan, Avery, 
and Schor, (2011) shows that businesses that managed to develop an underdog biography 
enjoyed increased consumer purchasing and greater brand loyalty. Theoretically, this paper 
demonstrates that the underdog effect is an important and underexplored motivation that 
charities could target to increase support and enhance their revenues.  
Conclusions 
The current study shows that when people are given the choice between a charity with 
substantial prior support compared to one with relatively little prior support, they prefer to 
donate to the charity with the least prior support. The main motivating factor behind this 
finding is the ‘Underdog Effect’ where people have a preference for the charity at an 
undeserved disadvantage. However, the ‘Underdog Effect’, as a motivating factor, driving 
charitable decisions may be limited to contexts where charities are easily comparable and 
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equally deserving. Further work is needed to explore how factors that are known to influence 
donation decisions like charities effective use of resources, charities impact on the cause, 
perceived worthiness and their reputation moderate the ‘Underdog Effect’(Bekkers & 
Wiepking, 2010). In particular, Michniewicz and Vandello (2013) showed that unfairly 
disadvantaged job applicants were rated by participants as attractive, compared to fairly 
disadvantaged job applications. Future work could examine the additional impact of the 
fairness of the disadvantage in accentuating the ‘Underdog Effect’. 
End Notes 
¹ Past level of helping behavior is a composite sum score measure of six yes/no items 
designed to measure charitable activity. For example, “Have you ever taken part in any of 
these charitable actives: Fundraising events, donating blood, helping in old folks home, 
helping in children home, donating money, and helping in a hospital”) 
² The crowdfunding pages were from a project called Fruitshare which was a TV Campaign 
launched by Hugh Fearnely Whittingstall to get children growing fruit trees at schools across 
Britain. The campaign raised £13,790 with a total of 97 projects (CrowdFunder, 2013). 
³Ofsted is an acronym well known in these samples for the ‘Office for Standards in 
Education, Children’s Services and Skills’. They inspect schools assessing the quality of 
education provision provided (see www.gov.uk/government/organisations/ofsted).  
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Table 1 
Comparison of sample size, gender composition, average endowment and earnings across all 
four studies. 
 Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study 4 
Initial Sample size 156 132 206 60 
Gender composition (% 
female) 
58.9% 54% 57.1% Not collected 
Endowment per person. £3 £4 £ 10* No Endowment 
Mean Earnings per 
person (SD). 
£2.09 (1.56) £1.01 (£1.09) £2.82 
(£3.61)* 
No Earnings 
Mean amount donated 
per person (SD). 
£1.90 
(£1.56) 
£1.98 (£1.09) £7.22 (£3.58) £10.49 (£10.91) 
Proportion of donations 
(% of donors vs total 
potential donors) 
76.67% 87.9% 89.83% 100% 
Note 1. Numbers in Brackets are SD. * A Conditional lottery was used in Study 3 so one in 
ten participants had their decisions remunerated. 
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Table 2 
 Average and total donations to Well and Poorly supported Charities in Study 1 and Study 2 
  Mean (SD) Sum 
Study 1 Least supported Charity (20%) £1.64 (£1.08) £120.31 
Well supported Charity (80%) £1.34 (£0.98) £90.19 
Study 2 Least supported Charity (20%) £1.25 (£0.91) £151.45 
 Well supported Charity (80%) £0.75 (£0.72) £95.25 
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Table 3 
A multilevel negative binomial regression model exploring the effect that the Underdog Effect 
has on donations made to charity during studies 1 and 2.  
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 
 IRR (SE) IRR (SE) IRR (SE) 
20% vs 80% Charity 
(0 = 20%, 1 = 80%) 
0.68 (0.1)** 0.68 (0.1)** 0.68 (0.1)** 
Observability (0 = 
Private, 1= Public) 
 1.00 (0.15) 1.00 (0.15) 
Gender (0 = Male, 1 
= Female) 
  1.08 (0.16) 
Past level of Helping   0.97 (0.06) 
Study 1 or Study 2 
(0 = Study 1, 1 = 
Study 2) 
  1.28 (0.19) 
Note 2.IRR = Incident Rate Ratio’s, SE = Standard Error, * = p < .05, ** = p < .01 .Model 1 χ²(1) = 
7.02, p < .01, Model 2 χ²(2) = 7.02, p < .05, Model 3 χ²(4) = 7.66, p = 060. N = 235. 
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Table 4 
A multilevel logistic regression model exploring the effect that the Underdog Effect has on 
the frequency of donations to charity during studies 1 and 2. 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 
 OR (SE) OR (SE) OR (SE) 
20% vs 80% Charity 
(0 = 20%, 1 = 80%) 
0.47 (0.13)** 0.47 (0.13)** 0.47 (0.13)** 
Observability (0 = 
Private, 1= Public) 
 1.14 (0.47) 1.23 (0.51) 
Gender (0 = Male, 1 
= Female) 
  1.92 (0.79) 
Past level of Helping   0.94 (0.15) 
Study 1 or Study 2 
(0 = Study 1, 1 = 
Study 2) 
  1.71 (0.71) 
Note 3.OR = Incident Rate Ratio’s, SE = Standard Error, * = p < .05, ** = p < .01 .Model 1 χ²(1) = 
7.17, p < .01, Model 2 χ²(2) = 7.26, p < .05, Model 3 χ²(5) = 10.87, p = .054. N = 235.  
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Table 5 
The amount raised by the five different schools over the first week of the campaign. 
The amount raised so far by the different schools 
are: 
School A has raised £136.50 
School B has raised £10.00 
School C has raised £120.00 
School D has raised £65.00 
School E has raised £110.00 
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Table 6 
Average and Total donations to the five schools. 
Schools Target 
(£130.00) 
Number who 
donated 
Mean (SD) Total 
Donations 
School A (£136.50) 4 £9.63 (£0.75) £38.50 
School B (£10.00) 91 £7.64 (£3.07) £688.00 
School C (£120.00) 26 £8.69 (£2.20) £226.00 
School D (£65.00) 35 £8.34 (£2.63) £292.00 
School E (£110.00) 10 £6.60 (£3.31) £66.00 
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Table 7 
Average and total donations to the five schools across what most people would do and what 
the participant would do. 
 What would most people do? What would you do? 
Schools Target 
(£130.00) 
No. who 
donated 
Mean (SD) Total 
Donations 
No. who 
donated 
Mean 
(SD) 
Total 
Donations 
School A 
(£136.50) 
11 £24.18  
(£58.40) 
£266.00 7 £8.71  
(£5.53) 
£61.00 
School B 
(£10.00) 
28 £15.16  
(£19.88) 
£424.50 33 £11.23 
(£9.99) 
£370.50 
School C 
(£120.00) 
8 £9.19  
(£4.24) 
£73.50 12 £7.58 
(£3.65) 
£91.00 
School D 
(£65.00) 
5 £16.40 
(£27.42) 
£82.00 5 £15.40 
(£27.76) 
£77.00 
School E 
(£110.00) 
4 £12.50  
(£8.66) 
£50.00 3 £10.00 
(£8.66) 
£30.00 
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Table 8 
Number and percentage of donors whose qualitative responses indicated Underdog, Impact 
donor or Equality motivations driving their choice of school.  
  Theories   
 Underdog Impact Donor Equality Quality  
Signalling 
Constructs Relative  
Disadvantage 
Making a  
difference 
 
Easy Reach 
of  Target 
 
Equality Quality  
Signalling 
Examples Least, Fewer 
etc. 
Difference, 
Change etc. 
Achieve, 
Closest etc. 
Equal, 
Same etc. 
Most 
raised. 
Why would most people give? (N = 59) 
School A N = 12 
(n (%)) 
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 8 (67%) 
School B N = 30 
(n (%)) 
 24 (80%)  0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1( 3.33%) 0 (0%) 
School C N = 8  
(n (%)) 
0 (0%) 2 (25%) 8 (100%) 0 (0%) 1 (13%) 
School D N = 
5
  
(n (%)) 
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 3 (60%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
School E N = 4 
(n (%)) 
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (25%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Why did you give to this school? (N = 60) 
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School A N =7 (n 
(%)) 
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (29%) 
School B N = 33 
(n (%)) 
22 (67%) 1(3%) 0 (0%) 4(12%) 0 (0%) 
School C N = 12 
(n (%)) 
0 (0%) 1 (8%) 10 (83%) 0 (0%) 1 (8.33%) 
School D N = 5 
(n (%)) 
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 3 (60%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
School E N = 3 
(n (%)) 
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (33%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note 4. Words used to record relative disadvantage were:  Least/Fewer/ Lower/ Less/Furthest. The words 
Difference/Change/ Impact/Worthwhile were used to capture the construct Impact.  Ease of target was measured 
by Achieve/ Closest/ Reach. Equality was captured by equal, same and similar. Quality signaling was captured by 
the term raised the most. 
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Figure 1.Example of the 80%, 50% and 20% full jars of coins. 
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Figure 1. The total frequency and total amount (£) donated to each school. 
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